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CASE COMMENTARIES  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a 
licensee’s ability to retain intellectual property rights under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(n) does not extend to the licensee’s exclusive distribution 
rights or trademark licenses.  Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, 
LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018).  
Duncan Bryant 
  In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the First Circuit 
addressed whether a licensee can retain exclusive distribution rights and 
trademark licenses after the licensor has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  
According to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), a company that is undergoing a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceeding may, with court approval, reject any executory 
contract that the debtor-in-possession deems would hinder its ability to 
restructure.  However, there is an exception — when the rejected contract 
is one ‘“under which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual 
property,’ the licensee may elect to ‘retain its rights to such intellectual 
property.”’  11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1).  Upon review, the First Circuit held that 
these rights of retainer do not encompass either exclusive distribution 
rights or trademark licenses.  
On November 21, 2012, Tempnology, LLC (“Debtor”) executed 
a Co-Marketing and Distribution agreement with Mission Product 
Holdings, Inc. (“Mission”).  The agreement provided Mission with (1) 
both exclusive and nonexclusive rights to several of Debtor’s products; (2) 
a nonexclusive, perpetual license to Debtor’s intellectual property, 
excluding trademarks; and (3) a nonexclusive, non-transferable license to 
use its trademark and logo “for the limited purpose of performing its 
obligations” under the agreement.  Mission was also required to “comply 
with any written trademark guidelines,” and Debtor retained the right to 
review all trademark usage.  
On June 30, 2014, Mission exercised an option to terminate the 
agreement without cause.  The termination option triggered a “Wind-
Down Period,” which would allow Mission to retain its distribution and 
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trademark rights until July 1, 2016.  On September 1, 2015, however, 
Debtor filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Debtor then 
filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to reject several of its active 
contracts, including its agreement with Mission, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
365(a).  Debtor informed the bankruptcy court that the agreement’s grant 
of exclusive distribution rights to Mission hindered Debtor’s ability to 
“derive revenue from other marketing and distribution opportunities.”  
Specifically, Debtor blamed Mission for its bankruptcy.  Mission objected 
under the theory that 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) allowed Mission to retain its 
distribution rights and intellectual property licenses.  
The bankruptcy court ultimately granted Debtor’s rejection and 
held that Mission’s exclusive distribution rights and limited trademark 
licenses could not be retained.  The court stated that distribution rights 
“could not fairly be characterized as [intellectual property].”  As such, it 
was not an exception to the broad rejection authority granted under 11 
U.S.C. § 365(n).  Moreover, the court reasoned that Congress’s omission 
of trademarks from the definition of intellectual property found in 11 
U.S.C. § 101(35A) was intended to purposely exclude them from the same 
kind of protection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).   
Mission then appealed to the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel (“BAP”).  The BAP agreed with the bankruptcy court’s assessment 
of the distribution rights but disagreed with its holding as to the trademark 
licenses.  Instead, the BAP followed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372 
(7th Cir. 2012), and held that the rejection of the contract between Debtor 
and Mission, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), only relieved Debtor of its 
contractual obligations but did not necessarily extinguish Mission’s rights.  
Debtor then appealed to the First Circuit.  
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that this was 
an issue of first impression.  Ultimately, the First Circuit agreed with the 
bankruptcy court and held that Mission’s exclusive distribution rights and 
trademark licenses were not able to be retained under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).  
First, the court defined the scope of the Debtor’s rights to reject or assume 
executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).  The court stated that 11 
U.S.C. § 365(a) was created to further the objective of a Chapter 11 
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bankruptcy by permitting debtors-in-possession to assume contracts that 
are beneficial to them and reject those that hinder their business.  After 
rejecting the contract, the debtor is left with a liability that is deemed to be 
a pre-petition breach of contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). 
Next, the court looked to the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 
365(n) and noted that Congress had explicitly enacted this section “to 
make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licensee to use the 
licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off.”  The court, referencing 
the congressional report, also stated that Congress did not mention the 
protection of exclusive rights other than those to intellectual property.  
Thus, Mission would only be able to enforce exclusivity provisions insofar 
as they related to intellectual property rights.  
The court also rejected Mission’s argument that its right to 
exclusively distribute several of Debtor’s products resulted in a de facto 
exclusive right to the intellectual property.  Here, the court noted that the 
very language of the agreement between Debtor and Mission made it clear 
that  “Debtor can use its intellectual property to make and sell products 
other than those for which the [a]greement grants Mission exclusive 
distribution rights.”  Furthermore, the court observed that “[a]n exclusive 
right to sell a product is not equivalent to an exclusive right to exploit the 
product’s underlying intellectual property.”  Mission also tried to argue 
that, because of its distribution rights, no one could use the underlying 
patent to sell the exclusive products.  The court found this argument 
immaterial, as Mission would retain its distribution rights regardless of 
whether the patent was used.  To hold otherwise, said the court, “would 
be to find buried in a parenthetical . . . an implied exception that would . . 
. likely cover as much commercial territory as do some of the rights 
expressly defined as protected.”  
The First Circuit also rejected Mission’s argument that its 
nonexclusive licenses would be of little value without the exclusive 
licenses.  The court noted that there were several ways that Mission could 
continue to use its nonexclusive licenses in profitable manners, including 
sublicenses, use, reproduction, modifications, or derivative work based on 
Debtor’s intellectual property.  “And if those rights lacked meaningful 
value,” the court noted, “that hardly becomes a reason for turning rights 
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that are not intellectual property rights into intellectual property rights.  
Rather, it simply suggests that most of the contract's value was apparently 
in the exclusive distribution agreement.”  Thus, the First Circuit held that 
Mission’s exclusive distribution rights were in no way retainable under 11 
U.S.C. § 365(n).  
The court also held that Mission’s limited trademark licenses were 
not protected.  The court noted that when Congress defined what types 
of intellectual property were protected under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n), the 
statute listed six different variants.  The court observed that no references 
to trademarks were included in the statute.  Furthermore, the Senate report 
on 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) stated that any decision on protecting trademark 
licenses were “postpone[d] . . . to allow the development of equitable 
treatment . . . by bankruptcy courts.”  S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5.  Therefore, 
the plain language of the statute and legislative history made it clear that a 
licensee cannot retain trademarks.  
The First Circuit also addressed the reasoning of the Seventh 
Circuit in Sunbeam, which held that although a rejection of a contract “frees 
the estate from the obligation to perform[,] . . . nothing about this process 
implies that any rights of the other contracting party has been vaporized.”  
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377.  However, the First Circuit observed that 
“rejection as Congress viewed it does not ‘vaporize’ a right.  Rather, the 
rejection converts the right into a pre-petition claim for damages.”  There 
is already a statutory provision that would preserve Mission’s ability to 
recover damages for the loss of Mission’s trademark licenses.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(g).  No rights would be “vaporized” by not allowing Mission to 
retain its trademark licenses.  
Furthermore, the court held that allowing Mission to retain its 
trademark licenses would be antithetical to the purpose of contract 
rejection.  The primary purpose of allowing a company in bankruptcy to 
reject executory contracts is “to release the debtor’s estate from 
burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.”  
However, if a company was forced to license trademarks, those licenses 
would necessarily require constant monitoring.  Failure to do so would 
potentially result in the original licensor’s loss of its trademark rights, 
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which, the court noted, would hardly be conducive to a successful 
restructuring.   
In an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part, Judge 
Torruella disagreed with the First Circuit’s holding that Mission’s 
trademark licenses were not protected.  He instead preferred the Senate 
report’s calling for “equitable treatment,” and proposed a case-by-case 
analysis as opposed to a bright-line rule.  However, the majority noted that 
bankruptcy proceedings are often costly and unpredictable.  Moreover, it 
is almost always impossible to determine how burdensome continuing 
licenses may be until the licensee’s subsequent actions are performed.  
Thus, it was better to establish a rule that would reduce future costs and 
litigation.  
Ultimately, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 
of the bankruptcy court and allowed Debtor to summarily reject the 
agreement without being forced to continue licensing its trademarks.  The 
court indicated that “we favor the categorical approach . . . unless and until 
Congress should decide otherwise.”  
The First Circuit’s ruling in this case creates a circuit split on this 
issue.  On October 26, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  They 
will decide “[w]hether, under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-
licensor’s ‘rejection’ of a license agreement — which ‘constitutes a breach 
of such contract,’ 11 U.S.C. §365(g) — terminates rights of the licensee 
that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable non- bankruptcy 
law.”  The International Trademark Association has filed brief amicus 
curiae in favor of adopting the Sunbeam rule, claiming that it “promotes 
the strength and stability of the trademark system.”  A group of law 
professors have done the same, arguing that a ruling in line with Sunbeam 
will “increase commercial certainty” and “protect the legitimate 
expectations of debtors and non-debtors alike.”  Oral argument in this 
case has yet to be set, but attorneys should have a clear answer as to how 
Section 11 filings impact pre-existing intellectual property licenses soon. 
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REAL ESTATE 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that in the dispersal of 
proceeds from the sale of joint property, absent an agreement to the 
contrary, a cotenant of real property is entitled to proportional 
contribution from other cotenants when the cotenant has paid more 
than her portion toward liens, taxes, and other encumbrances.  Talley 
v. Paisley, 525 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. 2017).  
Tanner Hamilton 
 In Talley v. Paisley, 525 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. 2017), the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky considered whether joint partners of a property should divide 
the proceeds of sale solely on the basis of ownership, rather than also 
considering the respective contributions of each partner.  The court 
ultimately held that a joint tenant is entitled to recover a contribution for 
payments made towards the property on a cotenant’s behalf.  
Consequently, the proceeds of sale should be used first to equalize the 
amount of expenses paid and then divided based on percentages of 
ownership.   
 This case arose out of the sale of jointly held property in 
Lexington, Kentucky.  In 2004, Anne Talley (“Talley”) and Daniel Paisley 
(“Paisley”) purchased a tract of land to construct a residential home.  
Because Talley was legally married to another person, the parties placed 
the property solely in Paisley’s name.  In October 2006, after Talley 
finalized her divorce, the parties placed the property in their joint names 
with a right of survivorship.  At that point, Talley had contributed 
$120,000 for the down payment of the land, and Paisley had allegedly 
contributed $109,942 for construction and loan costs.  In November 2006, 
the parties acquired two mortgage loans secured by the property for 
$225,000 and $250,000, respectively.  Both Talley and Paisley were co-
mortgagors and co-makers on the notes.  However, Paisley and Talley 
failed to execute an agreement regarding the disposition of the property if 
the joint tenancy relationship was to end.   
 After the creation of their joint tenancy relationship, Paisley began 
making all payments associated with the property.  In July 2007, Paisley 
paid $200,000 towards the $250,000 mortgage and then paid off the 
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balance in December 2009.  In addition, Paisley paid $19,119 towards the 
$225,000 mortgage and $3,052 to close a construction loan.  Further, from 
2007 to March 2014, Paisley made all of the mortgage payments in full.  
Paisley stated that he never demanded payment from Talley because he 
believed Talley would pay him back after she received her $350,000 
divorce settlement.  In January 2013, Paisley moved out of the property 
and his relationship with Talley ended, but Paisley continued making 
mortgage and insurance payments.  
Several months later, Paisley brought an action under KRS § 
389A.030 requesting the sale of the property and dispersal of all equity 
based on each party’s respective contribution.  The property eventually 
sold for $715,000, resulting in $477,397 of equity.  “Paisley proposed that 
these proceeds be divided based on the parties’ proportionate 
contribution and to reflect the fact that he had contributed more to the 
residence.”  His calculations showed that Talley had contributed $120,000, 
and he had contributed $383,921.  Consequently, Paisley asserted that 
Talley should only receive $105,500 from the proceeds and he should 
receive the remaining $369,500.  
Following a bench trial, the court rejected Paisley’s request to 
disburse the proceeds based on contribution.  Instead, the court held that 
the proceeds should be equally divided.  The court also emphasized that, 
had Talley and Paisley specified in an agreement regarding disposition of 
the property, the court would have been required to consider both parties’ 
contribution.  Paisley appealed the trial court’s decision. 
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals maintained the trial 
court’s finding that there was no contract regarding division but reversed 
the holding that Paisley was not entitled to proportional reimbursement.  
Specifically, the court stated that, as a matter of law, Paisley was entitled 
to proportional reimbursement for payments made during the joint 
tenancy, despite the absence of a contract mandating such division.  In 
response, Talley petitioned for discretionary review, and the Kentucky 
Supreme Court granted her petition.  
Talley argued that there is a presumption that property held in 
joint tenancy is to be held equally and, therefore, equal division of sales 
proceeds is appropriate.  She further claimed that even “if Paisley could 
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rebut the presumption of equality by clear and convincing evidence, he 
waived any right to contribution or intended his contributions to Talley 
to be a gift.” 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the appellate court’s 
decision, holding that “to the extent one tenant contributed more than his 
or her half to the discharge of encumbrances, liens, [and] taxes, that tenant 
is entitled to contribution from the other.”  In making its determination, 
the court considered its decision in Larmon v. Larmon, 191 S.W. 110 (Ky. 
1917), where the court established the general rule that a joint tenant is 
entitled to reimbursement from his cotenant for liens and encumbrances, 
including mortgages and taxes.  The court also revisited its decision in Petty 
v. Petty, 295 S.W. 863, (Ky. 1927), where it clarified this rule of recovery.  
Finally, the court briefly discussed its decision in Bishop v. Wolford, 
291 S.W. 1049 (Ky. 1927), which recognized that a contract is not a 
prerequisite to recovery.  The court further explained that “[e]quitable 
contribution[s] between co-tenants of undivided interests in real estate has 
often been recognized and enforced, even without a contract between the 
parties to that effect.”  The court acknowledged that the record did not 
reflect that Paisley intended to waive any rights to contribution or intend 
his contributions to be gifts.  The court simply attributed the absence of 
an agreement between Talley and Paisley to a failure of the parties to 
anticipate the ending of their relationship.  Ultimately, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ decision and 
remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court with instructions to award 
Paisley an amount “which will equalize [his] respective contribution.”  
After such an amount is determined and distributed, the court provided 
that the remaining proceeds shall be split equally. 
Justice Keller dissented stating that, under property law, the 
proceeds should have been divided based exclusively on equity.  In 
addition, he stated that such a holding misattributed family law principles 
into the joint tenant relationship.  
Overall, Talley seems to indicate that, absent an actual agreement, 
courts will likely find an implied contract between joint tenants that 
requires them to equally assume expenses.  This may be contrary to the 
original intentions of the parties, but courts are reluctant to equally divide 
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proceeds of a sale, when dealing with joint tenants, if one cotenant 
contributed more than the other.  Practitioners should be aware that this 
ruling differs from common law principles of joint tenancy, where both 
parties to the relationship are treated as owning equal shares of the 
property.  As such, practitioners should ensure that agreements among 
parties are documented and stipulate the disposition of the property in the 
event that the joint tenancy is terminated.  Moreover, if a joint tenant 
agrees to pay all of the expenses when the joint tenancy is created, only a 
binding contract will preclude the joint tenant from proportionate 
recovery if she changes her mind.  
SECURITIES  
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s whistleblower 
protection provision only protects individuals who have reported the 
alleged violation to the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Dig. 
Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767 (2018). 
Drew Hove 
 In Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether the anti-retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Act” or “Dodd-Frank”) 
extends to individuals who have not reported the violation to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”).  The 
Act was created to shield whistleblowers from retaliatory action by their 
employers.  A whistleblower is, “any individual who provides . . . 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission 
. . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).  The anti-retaliation provision also offers 
protection to individuals who were terminated or otherwise retaliated 
against after making required disclosures under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), or any other law subject to the jurisdiction of 
the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).  Through a careful reading of the 
whistleblower definition, comparisons between Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank, and an analysis of the Act’s Senate report, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “whistleblower” also 
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applies to individuals making disclosures otherwise required by law, such 
as those made with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley.    
 This dispute arose from Digital Realty Trust, Inc.’s (“Digital 
Realty”) employment of Paul Somers (“Somers”), as the Vice President 
from 2010 to 2014.  Digital Realty, a real estate investment trust, allegedly 
terminated Somers after he reported his suspicion of securities law 
violations to senior management.  Months after his discharge, Somers filed 
suit in the Northern District of California alleging whistleblower 
retaliation under Dodd-Frank, which provides a generous statute of 
limitations period of six years.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii).  Somers did 
not file an administrative complaint within 180 days of his termination to 
qualify for recovery under Sarbanes-Oxley, which extends its anti-
retaliation protections more broadly.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2002).  
Digital Realty moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that Somers was not 
eligible for Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection because he did not 
report the securities law violations to the SEC prior to his termination.  
The district court denied Digital Realty’s motion to dismiss, stating that 
reporting alleged violations to the SEC is not a requirement to obtain 
whistleblower status under the Act. 
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the Act should protect all employees, regardless 
of whether they reported the violation to the Commission.  The court 
acknowledged that the Act defines “whistleblower” as an individual who 
reports information to the SEC, but ultimately decided that applying the 
definition to the entire Act would require making disclosures as required 
or protected under “any other law, rule, or regulation” in addition to 
reporting the violation to the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)–(h)(1)(A)(iii).  
Furthermore, “such dual reporting,” the majority believed, “was unlikely 
to occur.”  Therefore, the majority concluded, “the statute should be read 
to protect employees who make disclosures privileged by clause (iii) of § 
78u–6(h)(1)(A), whether or not those employees also provide information 
to the SEC.”  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue, 
because both the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals had 
established conflicting opinions of the SEC reporting requirement under 
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision.  See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., 
2018]    CASE COMMENTARIES                
 
 
155 
801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding for an independent reading of 
Dodd-Frank’s definition of “whistleblower” and anti-retaliation 
provision); Asadi v. G.E. Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(holding for a dependent reading).   
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Act’s anti-retaliation 
provision applied only to individuals who have reported the securities 
violation to the SEC.  The Court began by reviewing the meaning of 
“whistleblower” in Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision.  The Court 
acknowledged that “whistleblower” is defined in the definition section of 
the Act, and directly instructs that the definition apply throughout the anti-
retaliation provision.  The Court also recognized that “another 
whistleblower-protection provision of Dodd-Frank imposes no 
requirement that information be conveyed to a government agency.”  
Thus, the Court could only reason that Congress intentionally placed the 
reporting requirement in the anti-retaliation provision. 
Next, the Court described how this reasoning corroborates with 
the purposes of both Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley.  The Court stated 
that Dodd-Frank was enacted amidst the 2008 financial crisis “to motivate 
people who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC.”  S. REP. 
NO. 111-176, at 38.  While Sarbanes-Oxley’s underlying intention was to 
“disturb the ‘corporate code of silence’ that ‘discouraged employees from 
reporting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities, . . . but 
even internally.’”  Lawson v. FMR L.L.C., 571 U.S. 429, 435 (2014).  Thus, 
both statutes were designed to protect individuals who report violations 
to the Commission.  
 The Court then acknowledged that Dodd-Frank, under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(a)(6)–(h)(1)(A)(iii), offers protection only after reporting to the 
Commission, while Sarbanes-Oxley, under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C), 
offers remedy without disclosure to any agency.  Dodd-Frank permits 
compensation for retaliation in twice the amount of back pay, plus interest, 
in addition to ten to thirty percent of the monetary sanctions, pursuant to 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii), while Sarbanes Oxley simply allows 
compensation for back pay with interest, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(c)(2)(B).  Thus, “Dodd-Frank’s award program and anti-retaliation 
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provision . . . work synchronously to motivate individuals with knowledge 
to ‘tell the SEC.’” 
After a thorough reading of the Act, the Court held that the 
“whistleblower” definition shall apply throughout.  Furthermore, the Act’s 
definition of whistleblower operates in tandem with the three provisions 
providing protection for whistleblowers by ensuring protection only to 
those employees who have also reported the alleged violations to the SEC.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).  The Court also noted that the Act’s 
increased awards signify Congress’s intentions to provide compensation 
for employees abiding by Dodd-Frank’s stringent requirements.   
Lastly, the Supreme Court briefly responded to Somers’s 
contention that auditors, attorneys, and other employees who are subject 
to internal-reporting requirements would be at risk with a dependent 
holding that requires SEC reporting.  The Court acknowledged that 
Sarbanes-Oxley does require auditors and attorneys to report claims 
internally before making any external reports.  However, the Court 
reiterated that the professionals will be protected under Dodd-Frank from 
any retaliatory actions by their employer if they also provide relevant 
information to the Commission.  
Moreover, Somers argued that the third clause, allowing protection 
for employees after making required disclosures under any law subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Commission, would be undermined by having to 
report to the SEC in addition to any federal agency, internal supervisor, or 
the like.  However, the Court saw Dodd-Frank’s power conveyed most 
accurately when requiring a disclosure to the Commission, because 
Congress’s intentions when writing the Act into law was to increase the 
number of securities law violations reported to the Commission.   
  Justice Thomas and Justice Sotomayor offered concurring 
opinions providing their thoughts of the majority’s reliance on Dodd-
Frank’s Senate report.  See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38.  Justice Thomas 
thought the proper holding of this case lies strictly in the “whistleblower” 
definition, without further consideration of the Senate report.  In rebuttal, 
Justice Sotomayor stated the best way to ensure fidelity to Congress’s 
intent is to analyze the report used to enact the law itself.   
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In conclusion, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed 
the District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holdings that 
Dodd-Frank does not require a report to the Commission for 
whistleblower protection and remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this requirement.  The Supreme Court indicated that the 
statute’s definition of “whistleblower” is clear and conclusive, and 
“unambiguous . . ., in short, [and] precludes the Commission from more 
expansively interpreting that term.”    
In light of this decision, to secure general employees, auditors, 
attorneys, and like professionals’ proper anti-retaliation protection, 
practitioners should ensure that the concerned employee has immediately 
reported the alleged securities law violations to the Commission for Dodd-
Frank protection.  Further, to be certain the employee will be afforded 
protection, the practitioner should ensure that they have filed an 
administrative complaint within 180 days for Sarbanes-Oxley protection.  
Because of the Dodd-Frank’s strict “whistleblower” definition, the 
Supreme Court cannot permit an expansive reading to offer help to a 
would-be worthy recipient who fails to report their claims to the 
Commission — effectively leaving some wrongfully terminated employees 
vulnerable.   
STATE AND LOCAL TAX  
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–
901, rather than § 67–1–1801, applies in a suit to recover municipal 
taxes, and under § 67–1–901(a) the plaintiff is required to pay a 
disputed municipality tax under protest to be eligible for a refund.  
Chuck’s Package Store v. City of Morristown, 545 S.W.3d 398 (Tenn. 2018). 
Madeline Leonard 
In Chuck’s Package Store v. City of Morristown, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court determined whether a plaintiff is eligible for a refund of disputed 
municipality taxes, whenever the plaintiff did not previously pay the tax 
under protest.  To answer this question, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
addressed whether Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-901, et. seq., or §§ 67-1-1801, 
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et. seq., govern municipality tax disputes.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–901(a) 
requires that taxpayers pay a disputed tax under protest to qualify for 
refunds, while Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807(b), on the other hand, 
eradicates the payment-under-protest requirement for taxes paid after 
January 1, 1986. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 57–3–501(a)(1) authorizes municipalities to 
impose an inspection fee on local, licensed alcoholic beverage retailers.  
The fee is limited, however, to a maximum percentage based on the 
municipality’s population, as calculated by the latest federal census.  
Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57–3–501(b), municipalities with fewer 
than 60,000 residents may charge no more than “eight percent of the 
wholesale price of the alcoholic beverages” supplied in the municipality.  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 57–3–501(c), on the other hand, provides that 
municipalities with populations exceeding 60,000 may charge no more 
than five percent of the wholesale price.  The City of Morristown in 
Hamblen County (the “City”) adopted an ordinance imposing an 
inspection fee of eight percent based on the county’s previous population 
of less than 60,000.  However, “[b]y January 2011, the county’s population, 
according to the 2010 federal census, increased to over 60,000.”  Although 
the City should have decreased its fee to five percent, based on the 
ordinance, the City continued to collect eight percent from alcoholic 
beverage retailers from 2011 to 2014.   
In June 2014, Chuck’s Package Store, an alcoholic beverage 
retailer, notified the City that it was overcharging inspection fees based on 
the population increase.  Although the City’s administrative services 
director initially acknowledged the error and promised to refund the 
overpayments, the director later informed Chuck’s Package Store it would 
not issue a refund.  In October 2014, multiple alcoholic beverage retailers 
filed suit against the City for excessive collections, seeking reimbursement 
and additional damages.  The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing 
that the retailers did not pay the disputed taxed under protest as required 
by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-901(a) and 67-1-911.  The trial court denied 
the city’s motion, holding that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq., 
applied to municipality tax disputes and did not require the alcoholic 
beverage retailers to pay under protest before seeking a refund.  After a 
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bench trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $452,120.51 as 
reimbursement for the excessive collections.    
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding 
that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807 applied to all taxes paid or issued after 
January 1, 1986.  “The [c]ourt of [a]ppeals construed [§] 67-1-1807 to 
remove the requirement for payment under protest for all taxes paid after 
January 1, 1986, with that statute controlling and superseding all 
conflicting laws.”  Because the court of appeals had previously issued 
conflicting decisions regarding disputed municipality taxes, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court granted the City’s application to appeal to establish 
uniformity.   
The supreme court first focused on the plain language of the 
statutes at issue to determine the legislature’s intent.  Tenn. Code. Ann. § 
67–1–901(a) “requires a taxpayer, before seeking a refund, to pay under 
protest any disputed state taxes.”  This provision, along with others, was 
expanded by the General Assembly  in 1959 to ensure that all sections 
included municipal tax disputes.  In 1986, the legislature created an 
exception to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-901 in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–
901(b), which states, “This section shall not apply to any tax collected or 
administered by the commissioner of revenue when such tax is paid on or 
after January 1, 1986.”  At the same time, the legislature also added Tenn. 
Code Ann. §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq., to the state code.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 
67–1–1801(a) outlines a taxpayer’s options for remedy whenever “taxes 
that are collected or administered by the commissioner of the revenue” 
are deemed “unjust, illegal, or incorrect.”  Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 67–1–1807 eliminated the payment under protest requirement “for the 
recovery of taxes as set out in [that] part.”  Finally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–
1–1807(c) established that “[t]o the extent that this section conflicts with 
any other law, this section shall control and supersede all such laws.” 
Therefore, the 1986 additions to the code permits taxpayers to forgo the 
payment-under-protest requirement whenever the disputed taxes are 
“collected or administered by the commissioner of revenue.”    
Next, the supreme court discussed prior appellate decisions that 
resulted in conflicting decisions.  In Lebanon Liquors v. City of Lebanon, 885 
S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), a group of liquor retailers sued the City 
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of Lebanon after a population increase led to an excessive collection of 
inspection fees.  In that case, the court of appeals held that Tenn. Code 
Ann. §§ 67–1–901, et. seq., governed municipal taxes because the limitation 
in § 67–1–901(b) applied only to “taxes collected by the commissioner of 
revenue.”    
In another case, Decactur Cty. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. W2001-
00858-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31786985 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), the court 
of appeals held that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq., governed 
municipal tax disputes.  The court cited no previous case law, but instead 
relied heavily on the plain language of the statute.  Because the statute’s 
language was “quite broad,” the court reasoned that Tenn. Code Ann. § 
67–1–1807 eliminates the requirement for a taxpayer to pay under protest 
before recovering refunds.   
The supreme court held that following the legislative changes 
made in 1986, municipal taxes and state taxes have different requirements 
for recovery under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67–1–901, et seq., and §§ 67–1–
1801, et. seq., respectively.  The 1986 revision to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–
901(b) and §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq., eliminated the payment under protest 
requirement for taxes collected by the commissioner of revenue only.  
None of the added provisions addressed municipal taxes.  Therefore, the 
court “cannot add ‘municipal taxes’ to these statutes to expand their 
scope.”  Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807(a) limits its own 
applicability to “taxes as set out in this part,” referring to a claim for refund 
under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-901 to 67-1-912.   Indeed, Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 67–1–1807 applies only to tax disputes by the commissioner of 
revenue. Furthermore, because Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807 does not 
control tax disputes under § 67–1–901, there is no conflict and § 67–1–
1807 cannot supersede the payment under protest requirement set forth 
in § 67–1–901(a). 
Additionally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–911(b) explicitly states that 
the General Assembly intended § 67–1–901 to apply to both state and 
municipal taxes erroneously paid to municipalities. Although the 
legislature could have included a corresponding provision within Tenn. 
Code Ann. §§ 67-1-1801 et seq., it declined to do so.  In addition to 
legislative intent, a broad reading of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807 to 
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remove the payment under protest requirement for all taxes paid following 
January 1, 1986 would impliedly repeal § 67–1–901 and § 67-1- 911, which 
the court disfavored.    
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision and 
overruled Vulcan Materials and other decisions inconsistent with this 
opinion.  Based on the court’s interpretation of the statutes, Tenn. Code 
Ann. §§ 67–1–901, et. seq., applies to municipality tax disputes, and a 
taxpayer must pay a disputed tax under protest to be entitled to a refund.  
Because the retailers did not fulfill the payment under protest requirement, 
they are not eligible for refunds to excessive tax collections. 
Following this decision, practitioners should advise clients to 
protest payment of disputed taxes to preserve refund eligibility.  Because 
parties must pay disputed municipal taxes under protest to be eligible for 
a refund, practitioners must remain up-to-date on the statutory 
requirements regarding municipal taxes.  Parties who are unfamiliar with 
the protest requirement for disputed municipal taxes will not be eligible 
for reimbursement of the excessive collection.  Indeed, transactional 
attorneys must ensure their clients remain aware of municipal tax 
standards to avoid losing money through excessive collections.  
 
STATUTORY  LIENS 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that, pursuant to Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 66-21-101, attachment of the lien-subject property is the only 
remedy available to a statutory lien holder who is not provided a 
method of enforcement by the lien statute.  Embraer Aircraft Maint. 
Servs., Inc. v. AeroCentury Corp., 538 S.W.3d 404 (Tenn. 2017).   
Dixon Babb 
In Embraer Aircraft Maintenance Services, Inc. v. AeroCentury Corp., the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed: (1) whether original attachment 
of lien-subject property is the only remedy available to statutory lien 
holders under the “catch-all” provision contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 
66-21-101; and (2) if special circumstances exist that allow a court to attach 
proceeds of the sale of lien-subject property when the property owner has 
made such attachment impossible.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101 provides 
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that statutory liens lacking a prescribed method of enforcement under the 
statute “may be enforced by original attachment . . . to be levied on the 
property upon which the lien exists.”  The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
held original attachment is the only method of enforcement authorized 
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101, while declining to answer the second 
question on the basis that it is not a defined question of Tennessee law.   
  This case originated from a contract between Embraer Aircraft 
Maintenance Services, Inc. (“Embraer”) and Colgan Air, Inc. (“Colgan”), 
in which Embraer was to perform maintenance on a SAAB-SANIA Model 
SAAB 340B aircraft (“Aircraft”).  Colgan originally leased the Aircraft 
from AeroCentury Corp. (“AeroCentury”).  The lease required Colgan to 
conduct a return inspection and perform certain maintenance services and 
repairs on the Aircraft before returning it to AeroCentury at the end of 
the lease term.  To meet these obligations, Colgan contracted with 
Embraer to perform the inspection and any necessary repairs.  In January 
2012, after working with representatives of both Colgan and AeroCentury, 
Embraer finally completed the necessary work.  Following Embraer’s 
completion, a repairman’s lien “secured by the aircraft automatically arose 
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-19-101 and 66-19-102.”   
On January 25, 2012, Embraer sent an invoice to Colgan in the 
amount of $351,465.20 for the work completed.  Colgan did not pay the 
invoice, and on April 1, 2012, Colgan filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  
Shortly after, Embraer, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-19-301, 
perfected its repairmen’s lien by filing a notice with the Register of Deeds 
for Davidson County and the Federal Aviation Administration.  Embraer 
also notified AeroCentury and Colgan of the lien.   
On January 25, 2013, Embraer filed an action in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee seeking to foreclose 
on the Aircraft.  “Embraer asked the [d]istrict [c]ourt to direct the sale of 
the Aircraft, order AeroCentury to surrender possession of the Aircraft 
and its title to the new owner, and then apply the proceeds of the sale to 
the debt owed by Colgan to Embraer.”  In July 2013, despite the 
foreclosure proceedings, AeroCentury leased the Aircraft to Private 
Corporation International Joint Stock Aviation Company URGA 
(“URGA”), an aviation company located in Ukraine.  In conformity with 
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the lease, the Airplane was exported to Ukraine and removed from 
registration in the United States.  
The lease gave URGA the option to purchase the Aircraft, which 
URGA exercised on March 25, 2014.  The purchase agreement stated that 
URGA would be receiving the Airplane free and clear of any 
encumbrances, except the lien, which would be removed after closing.  
AeroCentury did not notify the court or Embraer of the sale.  On 
November 24, 2015, Embraer filed a motion seeking summary judgment 
against AeroCentury, asking the court to foreclose on the Aircraft.  
AeroCentury filed a response, in which it disclosed the sale of the Airplane 
to the court and Embraer.  Specifically, the response stated that “any 
foreclosure order from the [c]ourt . . . is of no value to Embraer, because 
AeroCentury had sold the Aircraft and thus could not deliver it to the 
[d]istrict [c]ourt for sale.”  Following AeroCentury’s response, Embraer 
asked the court to order AeroCentury to deliver the proceeds from the 
sale of the Aircraft to satisfy the debt.  The district court, in an effort to 
resolve the confusion over remedies available under Tenn. Code Ann. § 
66-19-101, asked the Supreme Court of Tennessee to determine whether 
original attachment of lien-subject property is the only remedy available to 
statutory lien holders.  Additionally, the district court asked the supreme 
court to address whether special circumstances exist that allow a court to 
attach proceeds of the sale of lien-subject property when the property 
owner has made such attachment impossible. 
Regarding the first question, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held 
that the only method of enforcement for a statutory lien holder under 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101 is original attachment of the lien-subject 
property.  First, the supreme court established the validity of the automatic 
mechanic’s lien pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-19-101.  Because Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 66-19-101 does not provide a method for enforcement, the 
court turned to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101, which addresses situation 
in which a lien statute does not specify a method of enforcement.  
Interpreting this statute, the court stated it must first “ascertain and . . . 
give full effect to the General Assembly’s intent and purpose in drafting 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101.”  The supreme court noted that to ascertain 
a statute’s true meaning, its words must be interpreted according to their 
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plain meaning and in the context of the entire statute.  Further, statutes 
are not to be forced into a particular construction that would hinder the 
statute’s true meaning.  The Supreme Court of Tennessee, quoting its 
previous decision in Parker-Harris Co. v. Tale, 188 S.W. 54, 56 (Tenn. 1916), 
stated that “[w]hen a lien comes into existence by force of a statute, it must 
be measured by the statute, and can have no greater force than the statute 
gives it.” 
  Thus, the Supreme Court of Tennessee focused on the plain 
language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101, which only addresses 
attachment as a means of enforcement.  Embraer conceded, and the 
supreme court acknowledged, that liens established under Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 66-19-101 follow the property, not the proceeds from the sale of 
the property.  Since Embraer did not have a § 66-19-101 lien on the 
proceeds, § 66-21-101 provides no remedy for Embraer regarding the 
proceeds.  Further, the supreme court clarified that that use of the word 
“may” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101 “indicates only that the creditor 
‘may,’ or may not, choose to collect the debt by attaching the lien-subject 
property,” and “may” is not indicative of a legislative intent to include 
other remedies. 
As to the second question, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
declined to address the merits of the question because it was more of “an 
open-ended inquiry” as to methods by which Embraer may reach the 
proceeds of the sale, rather than a defined question of unsettled Tennessee 
law.  The supreme court expressly stated that it “limits [itself] to defined 
questions of Tennessee law for which ‘there is no controlling precedent in 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.’”  Furthermore, there 
are several other supreme court decisions that display various remedies 
available to Embraer.  Thus, the Supreme Court of Tennessee declined to 
answer to second certified question.    
 In light of this decision, practitioners representing repairmen 
should advise their clients to retain possession of repaired property until 
they receive payment for their services.  However, if the lienholder loses 
possession and the lien-subject property is unreachable, the lienholder has 
the option to seek alternative relief, rather than rely solely on the “catch 
all” provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101.  On the other hand, 
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practitioners who represent clients that are in possession of property 
subject to a repairman’s lien should warn their clients that selling lien-
subject property does not bar the lienholder from recovery and could 
result in harsher punishments.    
TITLE VII & DAMAGES 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title VII defendants 
have the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not exercise due 
diligence to mitigate their damages, and courts are required to 
analyze case-specific factors before awarding prejudgment interests 
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1961(a).  Pittington v. Great Smoky Mt. 
Lumberjack Feud, LLC, 880 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2018).  
Mary Beth Hendershott 
In Pittington v. Great Smoky Mt. Lumberjack Feud, LLC, the Sixth 
Circuit addressed whether the district court abused its discretion in 
denying a plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, when 
the jury’s verdict “awarded damages in an amount substantially less than 
unquestionably proved by the plaintiff’s uncontradicted and undisputed 
evidence.” (quoting Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014, 1021 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(emphasis in original)).  The court noted that back pay damages do not 
have to be proven to an exact certitude by a Title VII plaintiff, and any 
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.  The Sixth Circuit 
held further that district courts must examine several case-specific factors 
before applying the statutory calculation for prejudgment interest awards 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).  
This case arose out of a retaliation claim filed by David Pittington 
(“Pittington”) against his former employer, Great Smoky Mountain 
Lumberjack Feud, LLC (“Lumberjack”).  In June 2012, Pittington began 
working as a box office clerk at Lumberjack.  Pittington testified that 
during his employment at Lumberjack he generally worked eight or more 
hours a day.  Pittington also stated that he received two promotions and 
one pay raise (from $8 to $10.50 per hour) during his time at Lumberjack.  
However, Pittington testified that he began experiencing retaliatory action 
at work for supporting his wife in her sexual harassment complaint against 
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Lumberjack.  Specifically, Pittington stated that he was demoted, his hours 
and duties were decreased, and he was forced to work in conditions that 
aggravated his previously existing disabilities.   
Lumberjack ultimately fired Pittington on October 8, 2012.  
Following his termination, Pittington testified that he did not find a new 
job until April 2013.  Pittington’s new job only paid $7.25 per hour and 
he was laid off by the end of August 2013.  Pittington asserts that he 
worked a number of minimal paying, short-term jobs with unfavorable 
conditions during the two years following his termination.  During that 
time, he also experienced periods of unemployment.  Pittington sued 
Lumberjack, alleging that Lumberjack discriminated against him because 
of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
("ADA"), and as a retaliatory action for his wife's sexual harassment 
complaint, in violation of Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. 
Pittington requested that the jury award him back-pay totaling 
$40,632.50, and a prejudgment interest award calculated at 10%, the 
maximum amount allowed under the Tennessee Human Rights Act.  
Lumberjack argued that Pittington did not mitigate his damages 
adequately and should not be entitled to the full back pay amount that he 
requested.  The jury returned a verdict in Pittington’s favor regarding his 
Title VII and Tennessee Human Rights Act claims.  The jury, however, 
did not award compensatory or punitive damages.  As such, Pittington 
was only awarded $10,000 in back pay.  Pittington did not agree with the 
jury’s findings and filed a motion with the district court, asking the court 
to increase the jury’s damages award under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e).  Pittington also asked the district court for an award of 
front pay and prejudgment interest at a rate of 10%.  The district court 
denied Pittington’s request for front pay, increased back pay, and a new 
trial as to damages.  The district court judge did, however, agree that 
Pittington was entitled to prejudgment interest.  The court calculated the 
prejudgment interest according to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) in the amount of 
0.66%, stating that the requested 10% would result in an “undue windfall” 
for Pittington.  Pittington filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of 
damages, a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and appealed the 
district court judge’s decision to calculate the prejudgment interest award 
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in accordance to 28 U.S.C. §1961(a) instead of the Tennessee Human 
Rights Act.  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no 
reasonable jury could have found Pittington’s recovery of back pay to be 
$10,000, and the district court abused its discretion by denying Pittington’s 
motion for a new trial on the issue of damages.  The court’s decision was 
based primarily on its prior holding in Rasimas v. Michigan Dep’t of Mental 
Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1983).  In Rasimas, the court established that 
a successful Title VII plaintiff is entitled to back pay in an amount to make 
them whole for the wrong they suffered.  Additionally, a Title VII plaintiff 
does not need to prove an exact amount of back pay, and any ambiguities 
should be decided against the wrongdoer.  Lastly, Rasimas established that 
Title VII defendants have the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not 
exercise due diligence to mitigate their damages. 
Analyzing Pittington’s case under these principles, the court determined 
that the district court erred by attributing the jury’s limited back pay award 
to Pittington’s failure to mitigate his damages.  Instead, Lumberjack 
carried the burden of proving that Pittington did not exercise due 
diligence to mitigate his damages, which can only be satisfied by showing: 
1) availability of substantially equivalent positions; and 2) Pittington did 
not diligently seek these positions.  Lumberjack did not provide any 
evidence of substantially similar employment opportunities available to 
Pittington in Pigeon Forge, nor any evidence proving that Pittington’s job 
search efforts were unreasonable.  The jury’s verdict cannot be based on 
an inference of these two conditions.  Since Lumberjack omitted proof of 
Pittington’s failure to mitigate his damages, the jury’s award of $10,000 is 
not based upon the indisputable evidence.  Additionally, an award of 30–
50% of what Pittington was actually due does not fall within the 
acceptable range of back-pay amounts supported by the evidence.  
Finally, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court judge’s award 
of prejudgment interest at 0.66% pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).  Under 
Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Ret. Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 
687 (6th Cir. 2013), district courts are required to analyze case-specific 
factors before awarding prejudgment interests in accordance with 28 
U.S.C. §1961(a), including “the remedial goal to place the plaintiff in the 
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position that he or she would have occupied prior to the wrongdoing; the 
prevention of unjust enrichment on behalf of the wrongdoer; the lost 
interest value of money wrongly withheld; and the rate of inflation.”  The 
court found that the district court’s judgment only mentioned one or two 
of these factors in passing but did not make any efforts to explain or 
compare rates of interests with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1961(a).  
Without this case-specific analysis, the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that 
the district court abused its discretion to award prejudgment interest in 
accordance with the calculation framework of 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).    
The Court of Appeals accordingly reversed the district court’s 
denial of Pittington’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, since 
the district court applied the wrong legal standard in holding that 
Pittington carried the burden of proving he mitigated his damages.  The 
court also reversed the district court’s decision on the calculation of 
prejudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) because case-specific 
factors were not analyzed.   
In light of this decision, practitioners should present district 
courts with a formula to calculate prejudgment interest awards in 
accordance with the Schumacher factors listed above, to ensure that their 
client will receive equitable prejudgment interest awards.  This calculation 
should not create an unjust windfall for either party, but should focus on 
satisfying the remedial goals of Title VII and avoid unjustly enriching the 
wrongdoer.  On the other hand, counsel for defendants must carry their 
burden of proving the unreasonableness of plaintiff’s mitigation efforts 
by the preponderance of the evidence, and not rely on the evidence 
introduced by the plaintiff or upon the inferences of a friendly jury to 
obtain the desired verdict.    
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WILLS & ESTATES  
Under Tennessee law, a beneficiary who had a confidential 
relationship with the decedent may rebut the presumption of undue 
influence by showing that the decedent was  
of sound mind and acted independently when devising the estate.  
Frank v. Fields, No. E2016-00809-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).  
Phil Reed 
  In Frank v. Fields, No. E2016-00809-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017), the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals addressed how an attorney-in-fact may rebut the presumption of 
undue influence arising out of a confidential relationship with a decedent 
who changed his bank accounts to be payable-on-death to the attorney-
in-fact.  The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that, although a 
presumption of undue influence arises when a beneficiary is granted 
power of attorney, that presumption is rebutted when the power of 
attorney is not used to benefit the attorney-in-fact, the decedent is of 
sound mind, and the decedent receives independent legal advice.   
In January 2012, Ray L. Frank (“Decedent”) died at the age of 
ninety-five without issue or a surviving spouse.  Several years before his 
death, Decedent designated his nephew, Ronnie Fields (“Mr. Fields”), as 
his attorney-in-fact and beneficiary of several checking and certificate of 
deposit accounts that were payable upon the death of the Decedent.  Upon 
Decedent’s death, Mr. Fields withdrew $458,881.87 in checks made out to 
himself, leaving a total estate of $102,000.00 to be distributed according 
to Decedent’s will.  Three of the four remaining nieces and nephews in 
Decedent’s will (“Plaintiffs”) brought an action against Mr. Fields, alleging 
that Mr. Fields exercised undue influence through his confidential 
relationship with Decedent, and requesting that the trial court order Mr. 
Fields to reimburse Decedent’s estate for the money he had withdrawn.  
At the trial court, all parties agreed that Mr. Fields and Decedent 
had a close relationship in the years prior to his death.  In 2004, Decedent 
began losing his vision and Mr. Fields would eat lunch with him several 
times a week.  Mr. Fields also transported Decedent to appointments and 
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“anywhere he wanted to go.”  In October 2005 and December 2010, 
Decedent executed two powers of attorney naming Mr. Fields as his 
attorney-in-fact.  However, Mr. Fields did not exercise the power of 
attorney to change the payable on death status or ownership of any of 
Decedent’s accounts.  John M. Carson, Decedent’s attorney, testified at 
trial that while preparing Decedent’s will, he specifically reminded 
Decedent of certain assets that would pass outside his estate, including 
payable on death accounts.  He further testified that, while Decedent was 
completely blind at the time of executing this last document, “his mind 
remained sharp.”  
The trial court ruled, and all parties agreed, that Mr. Fields and 
Decedent had established a confidential relationship.  “Under Tennessee 
law, as in most jurisdictions, a presumption of undue influence arises 
where the dominant party in a confidential relationship receives a benefit 
from the other party.” In re Estate of Hamilton, 67 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2001).  To overcome this presumption, the dominant party must 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction at issue was 
fair.  Relying on testimony from Mr. Carson, several bank employees who 
oversaw the accounts at issue, and the parties, all of whom described 
Decedent as of sound mind, the trial court found that Mr. Fields had 
successfully rebutted the presumption of undue influence.  
 On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that “[i]t is rare 
to find direct evidence of undue influence.”  In seeking to prove undue 
influence, one usually must instead prove “suspicious circumstances” that 
give rise to a conclusion that the person being influenced did not act freely 
and independently.  The court, referencing their previous decision in In re 
Estate of Maddox, 60 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), provided that 
the most frequently relied-upon suspicious circumstances are: “1) the 
existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the 
beneficiary; 2) the testator's physical or mental deterioration; and 3) the 
beneficiary's active involvement in procuring the will.” 
The court also applied In re Estate of Davis, No. E2015-00826-
COA-R3-CV, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185, 2016 WL 944143 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Mar. 14, 2016), a similar decision, in finding that Mr. Fields had 
rebutted the presumption of undue influence.  In that case, the Tennessee 
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Court of Appeals upheld a decision where the decedent, who had filed for 
a divorce from his wife but died before it was finalized, attempted to 
disinherit his wife and daughters.  The court specifically noted that 
whether a testator’s decisions in their will are fair is not a relevant 
consideration when determining whether the testator was of sound mind 
and not subject to undue influence.  
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, 
emphasizing that all testimony, including Plaintiffs’, pointed to Decedent 
being of sound mind when designating his accounts as payable on death 
to Mr. Fields.  The court determined that the close relationship Mr. Fields 
shared with Decedent was convincing evidence that Decedent may have 
felt Mr. Fields deserved such a considerable share of his assets.  Finally, 
the independent legal advice that Mr. Carson provided Decedent regarding 
the payable on death accounts showed the court that Decedent was aware 
of the accounts being excluded from the will.  
The Tennessee Court of Appeals here focused on the sound mind 
of the Decedent when making the decision to split the remaining shares 
of his real and personal property.  Going forward, Tennessee attorneys 
need to be aware that a court is less concerned with the fairness of the 
decisions in a Decedent’s will, declining physical health, or advanced age 
when determining if the decedent was subject to undue influence.  Thus, 
attorneys may wish to take note of their client’s mental health while 
preparing a will and ensure that their client fully understands the technical 
aspects of their decision.  By doing so, attorneys can protect their client’s 
true wishes after death.  
 
